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tion in the near future." In spite of this allegedly practical comment, one
wishes the author had devoted more attention to the extent of the remaining
capital gains and losses problem if it were assumed that averaging were in
effect. There can be little doubt that any fairly good system of averaging would
have important advantages in addition to the direct improvement of equity.
It could lead to marked simplification in several parts of the tax law-notably
the capital gains field-and perhaps would even be an over-all simplification despite the complexity of the averaging system itself. It would permit changes
that would remove some of the pressure for avoidance devices designed to transform gains into the favored category of tax treatment. But as the author indicates without fully exploring, it would still leave a serious problem of realization
and possible deterring of transactions in which gain is recognized. This problem
exists partly by reason of the high marginal rates that some taxpayers would
have even after averaging, and partly by reason of lack of income tax on appreciation in value of property existing at death. Granting that any solution
of these problems would probably not be perfect, the area affected by them
might be substantially narrowed if averaging were in effect. For example, upon
such an assumption, it would probably prove fair to require a very long holding
period-say ten years-for assets given a preferential capital gains treatment.
The interests of lawyers and economists are sufficiently different that the
former might have put different emphasis on some parts of the subject of the
book. Are there any meaningful statistics on the amount of controversy and
litigation that has been caused by the differential treatment of capital gains
and losses? How has the Code and the tax system as a whole been affected by
this differentiation? For example, the problem of gain upon liquidation of a
corporation is not confined to the problem of collapsible corporations.
Mr. Seltzer's book provides basic data necessary to an understanding of the
capital gains problem. It is an important tool which will assist any working on
possible solutions. It is, perhaps, ungrateful not to accept the material thus
offered without asking for something more and different-solutions for our very
real difficulties.
ROBERT W. WALES*

Collective Bargaining. By Neil W. Chamberlain. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1951. Pp. vii, 534. 6.oo.
This work is primarily a textbook for courses in collective bargaining, or for
supplementary use in broader courses in labor. It will also be useful to business
men, union leaders, lawyers, and others interested in collective bargaining.
Its chief value lies in its thorough and systematic coverage of collective bargaining practices, enlivened by the frequent use of quotations from such sources
as court decisions, union publications, and the minutes of collective bargaining
conferences.
When Professor Chamberlain moves from the descriptive to the theoretical
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level, he is less successful. In Chapters 6 and 7, entitled "The Nature of the
Bargaining Process" and "The Nature of the Collective Agreement," respectively, he outlines three theories of collective bargaining: the marketing theory,
the governmental theory, and the managerial theory, which he favors. To each
is attached a corresponding view of the collective agreement, the agreement as
a contract, as industrial jurisprudence, and as administrative standards. Chamberlain's stress is on the logical development of the theories, and the results of
applying them. Thus he states: "The distinctions which have been made...
are not simply abstract issues or of academic interest alone. They lead to differences of practice which may be vitally significant in determining the degree of
success or failure of the bargaining relationship" (p. 157). This emphasis might
well have been reversed, for it is the practice in a given bargaining relationship
which determines which theory will fit it best, and the practice is in turn influenced as much by objective factors as by the theories of the participants.
The lack of attention to the external determinants of the nature of particular
bargaining relationships is especially apparent in Chamberlain's discussion of
union-management cooperation for productive efficiency. He is strongly in favor
of such cooperation, and optimistic about its expansion, even, it seems, to very
large firms. But, to date, cooperation has been confined to small firms in economic difficulties, and there is every reason to expect this to continue. To talk
of the possibility of union-management cooperation in Westinghouse or U. S.
Rubber is to ignore the fact that such firms are never likely to meet a competitive threat to their survival, or to the survival of the jobs of their workers.
Without this threat, unions are likely to act as watchdogs over management
rather than as partners with it. Nor is this necessarily undesirable, for in giant
firms, management can achieve a high degree of productive efficiency without
union assistance, but the individual worker may face pressing human problems.
The union which competes with management for worker loyalty may be better
able to solve these problems than the union which is primarily concerned with
increasing output.
When he turns to the economic aspects of collective bargaining, Chamberlain
indulges in the favorite indoor sport of labor economists---disparagement of the
marginal productivity theory. His opposition to the orthodox theory of wages
seems to be based largely on misunderstanding. For example, he gives as one of
the fundamental assumptions of marginal productivity theory that "we are
dealing with an economy composed of relatively small-scale business" (p. 336),
thus ruling the theory out of court at the outset. It is true that only under perfect competition will the determination of wages according to marginal productivity principles produce the optimum allocation of resources. Yet, the descriptive as opposed to the normative application of marginal productivity principles
to the monopoly case is so well known that it is hard to imagine how Chamberlain could have overlooked it. Some other assumptions of the theory-especially
profit maximization-run into difficulty in the monopoly case, but this lies at
a more sophisticated level of criticism.
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Chamberlain also argues that "the collective method of wage determination
would appear to invalidate the conclusions of a marginal productivity theory
which rests on the assumption of a small-scale owner-operator entering into
personal contractual relationship with individual workers" (p. 349). The error
here lies in viewing the marginal productivity theory solely as a theory of wage
determination. Actually, as it applies to collective bargaining, it attempts to
predict the consequences of determining wages by other means.
Much of the discussion of wage theory in connection with collective bargaining
is beside the point. Before any theory can be applied, it must first be determined
whether collective bargaining has actually altered wages. As Chamberlain notes
in passing (p. 373), research to date on this question has been inconclusive.
Chamberlain regards collective bargaining and the competitive price system
as incompatible systems. In this he agrees with his colleague C. E. Lindblom,
except that he welcomes the triumph of collective bargaining, while Lindblom
deplores it. In the opinion of this reviewer, collective bargining has had little
economic impact; its main impact has been on human relations. It has thus
been possible for us to achieve widespread collective bargaining without substantial alteration in the nature of competition.
ALBERT REEs*

Crime in America. By Estes Kefauver. New York: Doubleday, 1951. Pp.
xvi, 333. $3.50.

Crime in America is a book deserving of thoughtful consideration by all citizens. Based on thousands of pages of testimony taken in various parts of the
country, this book reveals a strikingly uniform pattern in our political life
everywhere. In New York City, the senate committee concluded that the notorious gangster, Frank Costello, "has exercised a major influence upon the
New York County Democratic organization" (p. 305), and has had close relationships with some Republican leaders as well. Costello, once convicted for
carrying a pistol, but better known for his leadership among New York City's
principal underworld characters, has been responsible for placing men on the
bench and was sufficiently influential during Mayor William O'Dwyer's administration to have his close friends appointed to high public office. In California, Arthur Samish, the lobbyist for the brewing industry who has had
"links with the underworld" (p. 254), boasted that he is "the governor of the
legislature" and "to hell with the governor of the state" (p. 238).
In Chicago, the senate committee accumulated a mass of evidence that conclusively proved the interests and connections of the Capone gang with politicians of both major parties. Miami Beach was found to be a focal point for a
vicious pattern of criminal and political corruption. During the 1948 campaign
for governor in Florida, the head of several dog tracks who "has had a long ca* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Industrial Relations Center.

